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The March. 1973, election closed the door to the
possibility of deposing President Allende con-
stitutionally, in that the government increased its
parliamentary base, even though it obtained only
44 per cent of the national vote.
The opposition in general, and the National Party
together with the pto-fascist sectors of the ultra
right in particular, opted for a strategy of
illegality and terrorist violence, in an attempt to
face public opinion, and the Armed Forces, with
a dilemma: anarchism or dictatorship. Helped
by the strategy of the ultra left, which was
seeking to create an autonomous popular power
base, the direct expression of the workers, the
opposition reckoned it would take no more than
six months to bring about the institutional
paralysis of the State, the undermining of public
order and security, and a schism within the
Popular Unity government.
The imminence of a coup d'etat became the
dominant feature of daily life from August, 1973,
onwards. On 11th September, the Chilean road
to socialism came to an end, tragically symbolised
by the death of Salvador Allende in the flames of
the presidential palace, bombed by the Air Force.
Only five hours were needed for the uprising to
reduce to dust the power structures of the govern-
ment, of the Popular Unity party, of the Marxist
parties and their extensive trade union base.
developed for more than 40 years. How can this
paralysis of the 1,630.000 Chileans who had voted
for the Popular Unity parties just six months
before be explained? Was it the lack both of the
will to fight and of the plans that were required
to hold on. if only for a few days, giving breath-
ing space which might have enabled them to
launch a political counter-attack, both internally
and internationally?
The military have declared that they expected it
would take theni live days to gain control of
Santiago and eight days for the industrial zone
of Concepción. "making use of all the available
fire power."
Instead, the collapse occurred in a few hours. In
the Moneda itself, only Allende and 23 of his
personal guards put up a defence. Over the whole
country, military and police losses, according to
the White Book, amounted to only 44. without
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a tank or plane destroyed, and with just one
helicopter damaged.
The facts are clear, but the same cannot be said
of their interpretation. The government and the
Popular Unity could have resistedthey did not.
Why? Now we know that they had never decided
what the government would do in the face of an
Army uprising, and that they had neither the
necessary arms nor adequate plans to resist. But
for a full explanation we need to look further.
With the opposition in control of the majority of
the State organs, the President, as the bearer of
Executive Power, had lost control of the nation
and government action became spasmodic and
incoherent. The imminence of a coup d'etat
exacerbated in turn the clash within the UP
between the 'constitutionalists' and those who
proposed popular mobilization and civil war as
the only way of dealing with a military coup.
The truth is that the fate of the Chilean con-
stitutional system had been sealed with the failure
at the beginning of August, of the 'dialogue'
between the Christian Democrats and the govern-
ment, and with the resignation in the same month
of the four Commanders-in-Chiefof the Army,
the Air Force, the Navy and the Military Police
from their ministerial posts. The terms of
General Prat's resignationexemplary Chilean
and soldierdid not allow for any illusions. "The
support of the majority of the Corps of Generals
having been withdrawn from me. my continua-
tion in the posts I presently hold would divide
the Army .
But a more fundamental question persists: was
the Chilean road to socialism ever possible, or
was it always condemned to fail? In other words,
did Allende have a real possibility of constituting
a government capable of carrying out his pro-
gramme, on the basis of a solid majority at the
constitutional level, as well as among the public?
An objective evaluation of the Chilean situation
in 1970 in the context of the social and political
evolution of the country during the previous ten
years, suggests that the answer is yes: Allende
and the Popular Unity party did have a chance
to constitute that double majorityinstitutional
and popularwhich was essential to the success
of the Chilean road to socialism.
The key factor was, without any doubt. internal
developments within the Christian Democrat
party, where, from 1963 onwards, an increasingly
strong current was flowing in favour of some
form of co-operation between the anti-capitalist
Christian forces and those of a lay and a
Marxist inspiration. The idea was not to enter
into any ideological transactions, which would
have been impossible, but (Q agree on a concrete
strategy. The 'social and political unity of the
people' was for the Christian Democrats, as early
as 1969, the indispensable condition for getting a
government capable of solving the real problems
of the country, and at the same time avoiding the
clear danger of institutional disintegration. The
presidential programme of the Christian Demo-
crats and the whole electoral campaign was based
on this central theme: the necessity of a concrete
and far-reaching agreement between the Christian
Democratic Party, the Marxist Parties and the
left wing of the Radical Party.
There was in 1970, and at least until July, 1971,
a real basis for the formation of a powerful social
movement, which would have included the over-
riding institutional and popular majority directed
towards the democratic transformation of Chilean
society in a socialist direction. This would not by
itself ensure that interests that would have been
damaged by such a government would not
attempt its violent overthrow; but the military
uprising would have been confronted, in that
case, by a radically different combination of
social and institutional power from what existed
on 11th September, 1973.
For such a wide-based consensus to be created,
however, it was indispensable to make it clear
that this was not just a tactical resource to drag
into the dictatorship of the proletariat those who
did not accept it in principle, nor believed it was
necessary in order to advance towards effective
socialist forms.
This was certainly the central question. And it
will be again when the present dictatorship dis-
integrates, corroded by the essential irrationality
of a scheme which attempts to impose capitalism
under the cover of a sub-machine gun and by the
magnitude both of its failures and of the suffer-
ings it has already imposed on the workers and
the Chilean people in general.
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